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Yale University is doing her full share towards the advancement of American Jurisprudence.

Of the judges now consti-

tuting the bench of the Supreme Court of the United States,
three are sons of Yale, and, if the wishes of her alumni who
are lawyers can prevail at Washington, she will soon have a
fourth in the person of Judge Simeon E. Baldwin, of the
Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, who has been, for
many years, the great high priest of the Yale Law School.
She was the first University in America to establish a graduate
course leading to the higher degrees in law, and affording to
students ambitious of becoming scholars an opportunity of
studying law as a science, and of rounding out their legal
acquirements with a knowledge of the more profound and
philosophical principles of jurisprudence as set forth in the
works of the great jurists of this and other countries. It is
the work done in such professional schools which led Professor Brice to say in The American Commonwealth: "I do
not know if there is anything in which America has advanced
more beyond the mother country than in the provision she
makes for legal education." To Judge DILLON and to Yale
we owe the book now before us, which consists of a series of
lectures delivered before the University by the author when
he held the Storrs professorship, and will tend to establish
still more firmly our title to such high praise from foreign
scholars. It is a work which every educated man, whether
lawyer or layman, will read with delight. The heavy paper
the beautiful typography, the digest o.f each lecture in the
table of contents, and of each paragraph on the broad margin
of the page, the table of cases and of authors cited, and the
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full index, combine to make the book one- of which its pub-lishers may be proud, and "The Laws and Jurisprudence of
England and America " are treated by the learned author with
that lucidity and grace of diction which always characterize
his writings. The first four lectures deal with "Our Law in
its Old Home-England." Beginning with definitions of lawand of jurisprudence, our author expressly states that he does
not mean to include in "our law" either the moral law, or thescience of politics, but merely "the law of the land as it
actually exists in distinction from what, in the view of the
law reformer or of the legislator or of the jurist, it is conceived or believed it ought to be," but he leaves us in no.
doubt as to his own belief in the intimate relation of the two
sciences of Ethics and Jurisprudence. "Ethical considerations can no more be excluded from the administration of
justice, which is the end and purpose of all civil laws, than
one can exclude the vital air from his room and live. Any
man who in good faith obeys the dictates of a pure and
honest heart, whose civil conduct towards his fellow men is
guided by the sense of justice and right, which is graven on
his heart by the Supreme Law-giver, will find such a course
of conduct, except in the rarest instances, to be in perfect
conformity with the requirements of the laws of his country..
This is to me conclusive proof of the social and ethical nature
and foundation of our laws."
The education and discipline of the English Bar, and the,
history, character and purposes of the Inns of Court, aretreated at length, and a long and interesting note on their
literary associations gives us fascinating details of the relations,
sustained to the Inns by such men as Beaumont, Bacon,
Fielding, Smith, Lamb, Thackeray and others.
"Our Law in its New Home-America," is the subject of thenext three lectures, and its expansion, development and
characteristics in the political and judicial systems of our own
country are given with a fulness of detail and a clearness of
statement which leave nothing to be desired. Confessing that
the English law lacks the artistic symmetry of its great rival
of continental Europe, our author, nevertheless, is in no doubt
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as to its superior adaptation to the institutions and character
of the English and American people, because it is pervaded by
a spirit of freedom which is essential to a self-governed people.
He dwells with pardonable pride upon our written constitutions
as the unique feature of American legal institutions, and says:
"History affords many examples where the holders of political
power have been forced to surrender or to curtail it for the
general good; but the example of the people constituting the
American political communities in limiting, by their own free
will, the exercise of their own power, stood alone when this
sublime sacrifice was made, and it has not been followed in any
country in Europe, nor successfully put in operation elsewhere
than in the United States."
No higher eulogium has ever been bestowed upon the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States than that given by this book, where our author
says: "I believe it will hereafter, more full r than at present,
be regarded as the American complement of the* Great
Charter, and be to us-as the Great Charter was and is
to England-the source of perennial blessings." We are
a little disappointed, however, in finding no expression of
recognition of the great work done by Charles Sumner in the
reconstruction legislation, and we look in vain, in the index of
authors -cited, for the name of that eminent American jurist.
The concluding lectures of the book are occupied with a
discussion of the excellence and defects of our law, and a
critical review of the nature and influence of the labors of
Blackstone and Bantham as types of the conservative and
radical forces to whose free play it owes its progress and
character. Commenting upon the complexity of the problems
with which American lawyers have to deal-a complexity
arising from our dual governments-our author, in a passage
of great beauty (too long to quote; see pages 218-i9), shows
how the States from an effective bulwark against centralization;
he considers at length the scope and consequences of the
doctrine of the authoritative force of judicial precedent, and
the uneven development of case law; he predicts that the
near future will see the union of legal and equitable rights and
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remedies now unfortunately separated; and he earnestly
appeals for a deliverance from the present chaotic condition of
our law of real property, which, although much improved by
many important changes in this country, yet remains full of
-complex subtleties and refinements.
The views of an author of such wide experience and profound scholarship on the live legal questions of the day are of
deep interest to the profession. Judge DILLON thinks the disfavor with which many of our best lawyers look upon trial by
jury in civil causes is deeply to be regretted, as he considers it
an essential part of our judicial system, tending to support and
perpetuate our free institutions. He has observed how readily
Supreme Court Judges agree upon questions of law and how
often they disagree upon questions of fact, and in this connection he denounces the scintilla doctrine, which prevails in some
of our States, and approves the position taken by the Supreme
Court of the United States that no case ought to be submitted
to a jury where the evidence in favor of the party asking the
submission is so weak that a verdict in his" favor ought to be
set aside by the court. The English judges, he tells us, are
selected from-the most eminent of the profession, and have a
permanent tenure and ample salaries. Here in Pennsylvania,
where we have an elective judiciary, where judicial salaries are
oftentimes inadequate, and where it is the exception rather
than the rule to find our greatest lawyers on the Bench, we
may well envy our more fortunate professional brethren across
the sea. Pennsylvania lawyers will also read, with an approval
born of suffering, the strong denunciation, by this experienced
judge, of.the refusal, by appellate courts, to allow full argument at the Bar, and the haste with which such courts dispose
of important cases, as if their highest duty was not to do justice
but to clear the docket.' The practice of assigning the record
- 1 Fortunately, the appellate courts in many of our sister 6ommonwealths are not so crowded with causes as in Pennsylvania. A justice of
the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut has said that his duties on
that Bench leave to him much leisure for study, and Mr. James C. Carter,
of New York, recently expressed his surprise at and disapproval of the
Pennsylvania rule limiting counsel to a half-hour argument on each side
in terms which led the writer to believe that the "hour list" was
unknown in the appellate courts of the Empire State.
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of causes submitted on printed briefs to one of the judges to
write an opinion, without a previous examination of the record
and arguments by the judges in consultation, ought, our author
thinks, to be peremptorily forbidden by statute. "With an
enlightened Bar and an intelligent people," says Lord
Brougham, "the mere authority of the Bench will cease to
have any weight at all, if it be unaccompanied with argument
and explanation."
Liberty, one of the great fundamental rights guaranteed by
our National and State Constitutions and respected and protected by our legislatures and courts, our author finds, has
been violated by the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States,
that the legislature could constitutionally prevent a man from
pursuing what ought to be, when carried out without deception, a lawful business, the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine.
Perhaps no part of this book will be read with more interest by the profession than that relating to codification. With
the judicial reports in England now numbering three thousand
volumes, and in this country not less, and increasing in both
countries at the rate of one hundred and fifty volumes a year,
it becomes an important question whether this multiplication
of books is to go on indefinitely and, if not, how it can best be
checked. Moreover, our condition in this respect being worse
than that of England, the question is of paramount importance
here. American lawyers may as well admit among themselves that there is much truth in the report of the American
Bar Association Committee when it says, '.A single word
expresses the present condition of the law-chaos. Every
law suit is an adventure, more or less, into this chaos."
Our author does not hesitate to dwell upon the want of
certainty, the want of publicity, and the want of convenience
of our law, and says that Tennyson has "drawn with the
sober pencil of a judge" the picture of
"The lawless science of our law,
The codeiess myriad of precedent,
That wilderness of single instances."
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Ufider these circumstances it is no wonder that men of broad
culture are very apt to find the details of practice repugnant
to their mental habits, and easily become disheartened at the
delay and uncertainty in the administration of American law.
We venture to assert that -it requires no depth of learning to
enable one successfully to practice law, and, on the other
hand, that it is no sign of a lack of intellectual vigor that a
man fails as a practitioner. Both Blackstone and Austin were
saved from successful practice for the more enviable and more
lasting, because more unattainable, fame of great jurists, and
their renown will be as immortal as the principles of English
jurisprudence. To one who witnessed that long-fought battle
of Saratoga (not that of 1777 but that of 1886) when the
advocates of codification, under the leadership of those giants
in debate, Daniel Dudley Field and our author, after earnest
conflict, at last won a victory-to such a one the position
taken in this book seems very conservative, and we presume
that few students of the subject will read, without at least a
certain measure of 'approval, Judge DILLO'S careful conclusions on this subject, where, after defining a code, he expresses
the opinion that codification en bloc is not feasible, says that
his idea of law amendment is that of Lord Bacon, and quotes,
as expressing his own idea of a code, these views of Mr.
Justice Stephen: "A code ought to be based upon the principle that it aims at nothing more than the reduction to a definite
and systematic shape of the results obtained and sanctioned
by the experience of many centuries." "In this .practical
sense, within these conservative limits, a code in England and
a code in each of the United States is," our author thinks,
"manifest destifiy." For such a scholarly restatement of the
law the American Bar will have need of the learned jurist and
While we agree with our
the profound legal philosopher.
author in his approval of Bentham's views as to the.inestimable value of the English law reports, and in his judgment
that our code must not presuppose that the Roman law is
superior in matter, substance or value, to our own, we question-whether he estimates as highly as he ought the need of a
careful study of the Civil law by those on whom may possibly
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fall the duty of doing for their own age what the great Roman
codifiers did for their time. Such men cannot afford to neglect the study of the greatest code known to the world, that
Corpus Juris CiviHis, which Maine revered because "our law
once will be like it."
The last lecture of this most interesting work contains a
rapid review of the progress and development of our law
during the past century and of the important contributions
thereto made by the United States. In this review the author
quotes largely from an address of Judge Baldwin, and the
paper of Mr. David Dudley Field on "American Progress in
Jurisprudence," prepared for the Columbian Exposition. In
the statement of recent specific changes in our laws upon
subjects of great and permanent concern, it is interesting to
note that the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 began to open
the prison doors of insolvent debtors in America more than
sixty years before the first act on the subject was passed by
the English Parliament.
"In the august counting of nations," Judge DILLON thinks,
"'America is rapidly discharging, in law and literature, her
great indebtness to Europe," and of this work, we might add,
our author is doing a noble part. Having completed his
retrospect of a century's progress, he ventures upon a forecast
of the century to come, and we close the volume filled with
a grand hope for that future when "the Old World may
become the acknowledged debtor of the New "-inspired by a
feeling akin to that awakened by Whittier's noble linet:
"I hear the tread of pioneers
Of nations yet to be;
The first low wash of waves, where soon
Shall roll a human sea."

G. G. M.

L.w. By
Baker, V6orhis

THE RISE AND GROWTH OF ELEVATED RAILROAD
THEODORE F. C. DEMAREST.

& Co.

New York:

1894.

This is a New York book, and particularly a New York
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City book. In a table of over two hundred cases, only two
cases are cited other than New York cases. The book is
really a history of the growth of an elaborate system of law,
relating to elevated railroads in New York City. The most
interesting chapters in it are those devoted to an explanation
of the aerial property right in the streets in New York City
by abutting property owners who have no fee in the surface of
the streets. The great difficulty in the way of the land owners
in their heroic struggle for damages lay in the fact that, under
the Constitution of New York, damages could only be recovered for a" taking" of private property, and as the municipality
and not the abutting owners had the fee in the street, it was
difficult for the court to establish an actual taking. The
courts seem to have solved the difficulty by making a distinction between a street, use of a street, and a non-street use. A
.railroad constructed upon the surface was considered a street
use, and for this no damages could be recovered, but when the
railroad was elevated above the surface it was considered a
non-street use, and it was held that there c6uld be no lawful
obstruction to the access of light and air to the detriment of
the abutting owner. The property right in the abutting owner
was then found to consist substantially of a right to have the
street used exclusively as such, and for no other purpose. It
must be confessed that, to the candid observer, there was a
very serious stretching of logic in establishing the existence of
this peculiar kind of property; but the end justified the means,
for it secured compensation to thousands of persons who had
been grievously wronged by the oppression of powerful corporations.
As the question of rapid transit, by means of elevated railroads, is one which will no doubt become important in many
of our large cities, Mr. Demarest's interesting account of the
law relating to such roads in New York, will have a large
number of appreciative readers. The book is well printed,
and contains an index which, though brief, seems adequate,
and an appendix containing a short account of the elevated
railroads in Chicago, and their legal status.
A. B.

WEIMER.

